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Abstract 
If constitutionalism denotes obedience to the 
Constitution, the scheme for enforcement of obedience 
and invalidation of disobedience should be found in the 
Constitution itself. It is important that this scheme be 
clear and the task of enforcement be vested in a 
constitutional body. In such a situation, the question of 
custodianship i.e., who will ensure the rule of 
constitutionalism assumes prime importance, as any 
ambiguity regarding the same will result in conflicts 
uncalled for between legislature and judiciary. This 
conflict intensifies when judiciary determines the 
constitutionality of the legislations and the legislature 
defends by placing it in the „ouster clauses‟ within the 
Constitution to exclude the judicial determination. 
Judiciary counters by nullifying the legislative attempts 
through innovative interpretation. An attempt is made to 
study Article 31 B, the most prominent ouster clause in 
the Constitution of India barring judicial review of 
legislations and how the Indian judiciary retaliated to 
such legislative attempts and effectively curbed them. The 
study outlines the historical reasons which necessitated 
the insertion of Article 31 B in the Constitution and 
analyses the myriad implications of such an ouster clause 
within the Constitution. The constitutional basis of 
judicial review is studied to audit the justifiability of the 
open ended Ninth Schedule along with Article 31 B. A 
comparison between Article 31 B and the other ouster 
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clauses namely Articles 31 A and 31 C is also made, 
bringing out the effect and scope of Article 31 B. The 
study covers a critical survey of judicial pronouncements 
from 1951 to 2007.  
Keywords: Constitutionalism; Judiciary; Judicial Review; Ouster 
Clause; Ninth Schedule 
Introduction 
Every state has a „Constitution‟ at least in the sense that it operates 
its important institutions according to some fundamental body of 
rules.1 Fundamental laws can come into existence either by express 
agreement among the members of a community, or at least the 
most powerful of them, as in the case of adoption of a written 
Constitution, or by gradual development of customs, as in the case 
of rules of succession governing traditional monarchical system.2 In 
both the cases, the continued existence of such laws depends on the 
presumption of a „Higher Law‟3 mandating obedience to the 
fundamental laws. This is the very essence of „Constitutionalism‟4, 
which like Kelsen‟s „grundnorm‟5 is a presumption of obedience to 
a Constitution, written or unwritten. The perception of such a 
„Higher Law‟ underlying the Constitution, acts as an effective check 
on all institutions, be it the Parliament or the court, operating under 
it. It is here that the question of guardianship of the Constitution 
and therefore, of the higher law assumes significance. The tug of 
                                                          
1 Encyclopaedia Britannica 84 (5th ed. 1974). 
2 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament 237 (Oxford 
University Press 1999). 
3 Edward S. Corwin, The ‘Higher Law’ Background of American Constitutional 
Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 152 (1928) (Corwin considers the Higher Law 
as certain principles of right and justice which are eternal and immutable).  
4 See 3 Carl J. Friedrich, Constitution and Constitutionalism, in Encyclopaedia of 
Social Sciences 318 (1968). 
5 See Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, (1934) 50 L.Q.R. 485 (in every legal 
order, a hierarchy of „oughts‟ is traceable back to some initial fundamental 
„ought‟ on which the validity of all the others ultimately rests. This, Kelsen 
called the „grundnorm‟ the basic or fundamental norm). 
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war between the judiciary and the legislature centres on the 
question of „custodianship of the Constitution‟6 in countries with a 
written Constitution. In the absence of a written Constitution, the 
issue is one of sovereignty7, that is, who is the creator of all laws? 
The Hobbesian theory states that at the foundation of every legal 
system there is a „sovereign‟, who is the creator of all laws and 
whose power is therefore above law.8 This theory does not always 
fit with the facts because in many legal systems there is no 
sovereign in the Hobbesian sense of the term. Neither the supreme 
legislature is sovereign because its powers are limited by a written 
Constitution, nor those able to amend the Constitution are 
sovereign, because their authority is also conferred and controlled 
by its provisions. If the supreme legislature is also considered to be 
bound by the Constitution, then the power to check legislative 
aberrations invariably lies with the judiciary. Here, there is a 
possibility that the Parliament might evade judicial scrutiny by 
incorporating within the Constitution an ouster clause holding it 
impermissible for the court to enter certain specified areas. The 
device of entrenching legislations beyond the reach of the judiciary, 
even if they infringe the fundamental rights of the citizen, is known 
as the „legislative override‟ and is a Canadian contribution to the 
                                                          
6 Granville Austin, The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Custody of the 
Constitution, in Supreme But Not Infallible 1 (B.N. Kirpal ed., 2000) 
(Austin says that the issue of custody is never finally settled because the 
contestants for it are the most powerful institutions of Government and 
the balance in a system of checks and balances is never firmly horizontal). 
7 See generally Goldsworthy, supra note 2. 
8See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin 
Books 1968). But see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 50-71 (1961) (even 
monarchies are often governed by laws that determine who has the right 
to succeed to the throne, which the monarchs themselves are not able to 
amend. Hart argued that legal rules, rather than sovereigns, constitute the 
foundations of legal systems. Hart‟s theory of law, so effective in its 
criticisms of the Hobbessian theory, has itself been powerfully criticised 
by Ronald Dworkin, who argues that legal principles, rather than rules, 
constitute the foundations of legal systems). See also RONALD DWORKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-131 (1977). 
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theory of constitutionalism9.  The legitimacy of one such ouster 
clause within the Constitution of India is the crux of this study. 
The Basis of Judicial Review under the Indian Constitution 
The concept of judicial review was outlined by the Chief Justice 
Marshall of the United States Supreme Court in Marbury v. 
Madison10 wherein it was held that, “It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is…”, and 
that  
If a law be in opposition to the Constitution, if both the law 
and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the 
court must either decide that case conformably to the law, 
disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to the 
Constitution, disregarding the law, the court must 
determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. 
This is the very essence of judicial duty. If then, the courts 
are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is 
superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the 
Constitution and not such ordinary act, must govern the 
case to which they both apply.11 
Lord Edward Coke of the Court of Common Pleas in England as 
early as in 1610 in Dr. Bonham’s case12 had held that “When an Act 
of Parliament is against Common law and reason or impossible to 
be performed, it is void”.  
The Constitution of India guarantees to its citizens certain 
fundamental rights embodied in Part III of the Constitution. Article 
                                                          
9 See generally, Geoffrey Marshall, Canada’s New Constitution (1982): Some 
Lessons in Constitutional Engineering, in CONSTITUTIONS IN DEMOCRATIC 
POLITICS 163 – 165 (Vernon Bogdanor ed., 1988) (similar ouster clauses 
were also incorporated in the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 
1975 and in the Alberta Provincial Bill of Rights of 1972). 
10 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803). 
11 Id. 
12 Thomas Bonham v. College of Physicians, 8 Co. Rep. 114. 
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13, which itself is a fundamental right, embodies a general norm of 
Indian constitutional law that the fundamental rights of individuals 
should be kept inviolable from the legislative and executive 
encroachments. The Courts trace their power of judicial review 
from the reservoir of Article 13 (2), with respect to post 
Constitution laws.13 By virtue of this Article, the courts can strike 
down any law which is inconsistent with or in derogation of the 
fundamental rights. In other words, the Parliament of India was not 
meant to be a sovereign law making body. Justice Mukherjee 
observed in A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras14 “The Constitution of 
India is a written Constitution and though it has adopted many of 
the principles of the English parliamentary system, it has not 
accepted the English doctrine of absolute supremacy of Parliament 
in matters of legislation.” In the words of Chief Justice Kania, “The 
inclusion of Article 13(1) and (2) appears to be a matter of abundant 
caution. Even in their absence, if any of the fundamental rights was 
infringed by any legislative enactment, the court has always the 
power to declare the enactment; to the extent it transgresses the 
limits invalid.”15 
Ouster Clause in the Indian Constitution 
When the High Court‟s struck down various land reform 
legislations on the ground that it takes way the fundamental right 
to property of the zamindars16, the interim Parliament, by way of 
Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, carved out an area of 
exception to the general rule laid down in Article 13 by adding Part 
                                                          
13 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA art. 13(2) (declares that “The State shall not 
make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this 
Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent 
of such contravention be void.”). 
14 A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27, 91. 
15 Id. at 34 (emphasis added). 
16 IX CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY DEBATES, 1195-96 (1949). 
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III of the Constitution, Articles 31A17 and 31B and the ninth 
schedule was attached to Article 31B.  
Article 31B reads thus: 
Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions 
contained in Article 31-A, none of the Acts and Regulations 
specified in the ninth schedule nor any of the provisions 
thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become 
void on the ground that such Act, regulation or provision  is 
inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the 
rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and not 
withstanding any judgment,  decree or order of any court or 
tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and 
regulations shall, be subject to the power of any competent 
legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force. 
Following are the main implications of this Article: 
a) Retrospective protection is given to the laws included in the 
Schedule, from the date of passing of the law and not 
merely from the date of entry into the Schedule. 
b) The protection is against Part III challenges as a whole. 
c) Thus the legislature may make any law curtailing the 
fundamental rights and place it in the ninth schedule by 
way of a constitutional amendment. 
d) The Ninth Schedule shuts its door against any judicial 
scrutiny based on fundamental rights challenge. 
e) The schedule also has the effect of nullifying judicial 
pronouncements both prospectively and retrospectively. 
f) The overall effect is that fundamental rights are made 
unenforceable in law, in so far as the Ninth Schedule 
inclusions are concerned. 
                                                          
17 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA art. 31A(e) (Saving of laws providing for 
acquisition of estates etc. against challenges based on art. 14 and art. 19). 
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g) The entries in the schedule, in spite of having been given a 
place within the Constitution can be repealed or amended 
by the competent legislature. 
The Ninth Schedule unquestionably acts as a „protective umbrella‟18 
which saves legislations from heavy judicial pouring. The very 
insertion of Ninth Schedule in the Constitution is controversial as it 
“creates a constitutional paradox and inner constitutional 
contradiction”.19 On the one hand the Constitution declares that 
state shall not make any law which takes away or abridges any of 
the rights conferred by Part III, and on the other it says that the 
laws inconsistent with Part III cannot be challenged before a court 
of law if they are included in the Ninth Schedule. M.P. Jain 
describes Article 31B and Ninth Schedule a „drastic‟ and „an 
unjustifiable technique of constitutional amendment‟.20 Another 
view is to see the mechanism as an appropriate compromise 
formula which sorts out the dichotomy between judicial review 
and legislative power.21 In matters concerning economic goals, 
legislature is the more competent body and in matters affecting 
citizens‟ life, liberty and equality, the judiciary should undoubtedly 
be the final authority. 
Is Article 31B Wider than the Other Ouster Clauses? 
In addition to Article 31B there are two more ouster clauses of the 
same genus in Part III of the Constitution namely Article 31A22 and 
Article 31C23. The protective zone of Article 31B is much wider than 
these two ouster clauses. Even if Articles 31A and 31C also exclude 
                                                          
18 See generally N.K. JAYAKUMAR, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN INDIA: LIMITATIONS 
AND LEEWAYS (APH Publishing Corporation 1997). 
19 Baldev Singh, Ninth Schedule to the Constitution of India: A Study, 37 J. 
INDIAN L. INST. 457, 464 (1995). 
20 M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1408 (6th ed. 2010). 
21 P. Ishwara Bhat, Limits of Ninth Schedule’s Openness, 19 C.U.L.R 232, 236 
(1995). 
22 Inserted by the Constitution (First) Amendment Act, 1951. 
23 Inserted by the Constitution (Twenty Fifth) Amendment Act, 1971. 
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judicial review, the exclusion is limited to challenges based on 
Articles 14 and 19 and that too only for laws giving effect to certain 
specified purposes.24 Omnipotently, Article 31B saves uncatalogued 
number of laws from challenge on the basis of all or any of the 
fundamental rights, if such laws are included in the Ninth 
Schedule. If not for the judicial construal, Article 31B as it reads, is 
capable of protecting laws which violate even right to life under 
Article 21, the most precious of all fundamental rights.  
Historical Background of Ninth Schedule 
The circumstances leading to the Constitution (First Amendment) 
Act, 1951, which inserted Article 31-B and the Ninth Schedule, need 
to be examined for a proper understanding of the purpose and 
scope of the Schedule.25 
India had a caste based closed hierarchical system of society in 
which a person‟s status and privileges were invariably associated 
with the caste in which he was born.26 This in turn had a close 
nexus with the forms and types of land rights assigned to be 
enjoyed by each caste.27 The outmoded and inegalitarian structure 
that prevailed in pre independent India28 had resulted in unequal 
                                                          
24 Art. 31 A protected laws giving effect to acquisition of estates etc, while 
Article 31 C immunises laws giving effect to 31(b) and (c). 
25 LXV LOK SABHA DEBATES, No.1. Col.116 (1977) (when the Forty Second 
Amendment Bill was being discussed in the Lok Sabha, Mr. Deputy 
Speaker was quoted “You spend too much time on background” and Shri 
Sezhiyan stated “Because background is the most important thing in a 
Constitution Amendment Bill”. This is true of every constitutional 
amendment). 
26 See B. KUPPUSWAMY, SOCIAL CHANGE IN INDIA (5th ed. 1994). See also 
CASTE TODAY (C.J. Fuller ed., 1997); MARC GALANTER, LAW AND SOCIETY IN 
MODERN INDIA (1989); M.N. SREENIVAS, INDIA: SOCIAL STRUCTURE 3-47 
(1991). 
27 See H.C.L. MERILLAT, LAND AND THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 110-112 
(1970). 
28 Id. at 113; See also GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 73 (4th ed. 1999). 
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distribution of income, wealth and disparities in the standard of 
living.29 So when India became independent, the nation was not as 
independent as the people wanted it to be. It was in the hands of 
the landowners, zamindars, princes, businessmen who were 
unwilling to contribute to the economic welfare of the nation. This 
was in addition to the already existing menace namely, landless 
labour, unemployed and under paid workers.30 
Congress and the Social Revolution  
The Congress, as the party of independence movement had long 
back been committed to the policy of „land to the tiller‟, as is 
evident from the presidential address by Jawaharlal Nehru31 in the 
Lahore Session32 and also in the Karachi Resolution.33 This ardent 
desire of the Congress party was reflected in the Constituent 
Assembly deliberations. The social revolution was put at the top of 
the agenda by the Constituent Assembly when it adopted the 
objectives resolution34 which called for social, economic, and 
political justice and equality of status and of opportunity for all. 
Thus what they aimed at was to create a document, „The 
Constitution of India‟ which would pave the way for an egalitarian 
society. In this pursuit, there was the case of defining and 
prioritising social, economic and political justice. There was also 
the problem of liberty versus justice.  
                                                          
29 DADA BHAI NAOROJI, POVERTY AND UN- BRITISH RULE IN INDIA 34 (1962); 
See also, RUDDAR DATT & K.P.M.SUNDARAM, INDIAN ECONOMY 121-122 
(1990). 
30 RAJEEV DHAVAN, THE AMENDMENT: CONSPIRACY OR REVOLUTION 17-18 
(1st ed. 1978). 
31 See, 1 DOROTHY NORMAN, NEHRU THE FIRST SIXTY YEARS 204-205, 249 
(1965). 
32 LAHORE SESSION (Dec. 29, 1929). 
33  KARACHI SESSION, Resolution on Fundamental Rights and Economic Policy 
(Aug 6-8, 1931). 
34 See 1 CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY DEBATES (Dec. 13, 1946) (Jawaharlal 
Nehru prepared and moved the resolution). 
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The Indian Constitution sought a balance between the principles of 
liberty and justice by containing within Part III, two articles viz., 
Articles 19(1)(f) and 31.35 The former provided for the individual 
freedom to acquire, hold and dispose of property and the latter 
gave power to the state to acquire property for public purpose after 
paying compensation. The paradox is that the proposed balance 
created all the more imbalances as the issue involved the delicate 
nexus between the individual‟s right to property and the public 
interest. These two often overlap and generate conflicts. According 
to Jawaharlal Nehru, these two conflicting interests can be balanced 
“to some extent by legal means, but ultimately the balancing 
authority can only be the sovereign legislature of the country which 
can keep before it all the various factors – all the public, political 
and other factors…”36 Regarding the compensation to be paid to 
the property owners, he observed:  
Parliament fixes . . . the compensation . . . and they should 
not be challenged except . . . where… there has been a fraud 
on the Constitution . . . . But normally speaking, one 
presumes that any Parliament representing the entire 
community of the nation will not commit a fraud on its own 
Constitution and will be very much concerned with doing 
justice to the individual as well as to the community.37 
It was further observed: 
No Supreme Court and no judiciary can stand in judgment 
over the sovereign will of the Parliament representing the 
will of the entire community…. sometimes even the 
legislature may go wrong, but ultimately the fact remains 
that the Legislature must be supreme and must not be 
interfered with by the Courts of law in such measures of 
social reform.38 
                                                          
35 Deleted by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. 
36 IX CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY DEBATES, 1193 (1949) (Jawaharlal Nehru 
was speaking on the draft Article 24, which corresponds to Article 31). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 1195-1196. 
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The work to be done by the courts and their prohibitions39 were 
thus clearly spelt out in the Constituent Assembly, as far as the 
individual right to property was concerned. With the Constitution 
coming into force, the courts lost no time in safeguarding 
individual freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, totally 
disregarding the spirit of the framers of the Constitution in 
bringing about the social revolution. Three cases,40 which were filed 
by the zamindars and other intermediaries challenging the 
zamindari abolition laws, reached the High Courts wherein the 
impugned statutes were held violative of one or the other of the 
fundamental rights of the petitioners. The makers of the 
Constitution wanted the court to defend the liberties of the citizen, 
at the same time render support to governmental social welfare 
programs. But the courts also had to ensure that these schemes 
were not inconsistent with the basic principles of libertarian 
socialism enshrined in the Constitution. All these made the position 
of the judges of the infant nation very difficult. Moreover, as rightly 
pointed out by a writer, “To think that a small group of judges 
trained in the methods of English law, could be transformed into 
social revolutionaries overnight, was also too much to expect.”41 
                                                          
39 The prohibition being that the courts are not to transform itself into a 
third chamber. 
40 Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 91; West Bengal 
Settlement Kanungoe Cooperative Society v. Mrs. Bela Banerjee, A.I.R. 
1951 Cal. 111; Subodh Gopal Bose v. Bihari Lal Dolui, A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 85. 
41 Rajeev Dhavan, Justice on Trial: The Supreme Court Today 25 (1980). 
See also James S. Read, The New Common Law of the Commonwealth: The 
Judicial Response to Bill of Rights, 25 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 31, 34 (1999) 
(the writer notes that in 1950s in India (where courts performed 
remarkably better) the application of fundamental rights got off to an 
economically inactive start as lawyers and judges confronted the novelty 
of such provisions in a common law context).  
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The First Amendment to the Constitution: A Remedial 
Measure 
The constituent assembly itself became the Interim Parliament of 
the country in 1950 - ‟51. It made the Constitution First 
Amendment Act, 1951 which inter alia inserted Articles 31A and 
31B in Part III of the Constitution and the Ninth Schedule was 
appended to Article 31B. These provisions were inserted for fully 
securing the constitutional validity of zamindari abolition laws in 
general and certain specified state acts in particular.42 
Was Ninth Schedule of the Constitution meant to be Open 
Ended? 
There are two views regarding the „openness‟ of the Ninth 
Schedule of the Constitution.43 The narrow view is that Article 31B 
imposed a definite and determinate restriction on the fundamental 
rights by carving out of their sphere of operation thirteen specified 
statutes. These Acts could have been placed under Article 31B 
itself, the schedule was merely for convenience. Therefore what the 
later amendments had done was that the Article was implicitly 
reenacted in its entirety, in respect of a fresh set of laws. According 
to the broad view, Article 31B imposed an indefinite and 
indeterminate restriction on the fundamental rights through a 
schedule mechanism, indicating that its contents could fluctuate 
from time to time. As Blackshield observed, “It inserts into Part III 
itself a proviso which might be paraphrased: provided that these 
guarantees shall not apply to such statutes as the Parliament may 
schedule from time to time”.44 
The words „no law providing for‟ in Article 31A and „no law giving 
effect to‟ in Article 31C indicate that, whenever laws are made for a 
particular purpose, they are protected against certain fundamental 
rights. This is in contrast to the words „none of the Acts… specified 
                                                          
42 See The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. 
43 See A.R. Blackshield, Fundamental Rights and the Economic Viability of the 
Indian Nation, 10 J. INDIAN L. INST. 57, 101-102 (1968). 
44 Id. at 102 (emphasis added). 
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in the Ninth Schedule‟ which projects a different connotation, that 
is, the protection from any of the fundamental rights is afforded 
only to the Acts and regulations which are already specified in the 
Ninth Schedule. To substantiate this interpretation it is submitted 
that while Articles 31A and 31C mandate presidential assent to the 
state laws as a condition precedent to avail protection. Nothing in 
Article 31B suggests about future inclusions into the schedule.  
When the schedule was first added to the Constitution, it had 
thirteen Acts, all dealing with land reforms. When some members 
of the Select Committee45 had wanted certain more statutes to be 
included in the schedule, Jawaharlal Nehru requested them not to 
press the matter and observed thus: 
It is not with any great satisfaction or pleasure that we have 
produced this long schedule. We do not wish to add to it for 
two reasons. One is that the schedule consists of a particular 
type of legislation . . . and another type should not come in. 
Secondly, every single measure included in this schedule … 
has gone through a process of examination, analysis and 
scrutiny and we can take a certain responsibility about it. If 
you go on adding . . . it is not fair . . . or just to this 
Parliament or to this country.46 
These words indicate that the schedule was not designed to be a 
permanent mechanism to escape from unfavorable decisions. 
Article 31B and its appended Ninth Schedule was simply a 
convenient legislative device for asserting that those thirteen Acts 
were valid. Thereafter, the idea was conceived that other Acts 
could be brought within the protective umbrella of Article 31B by 
adding their titles to the Ninth Schedule.  
The true purpose of the schedule was to save the land reform 
legislations from being challenged in courts of law. The deviation 
from this purpose occurred right from Jawaharlal Nehru‟s time, 
                                                          
45 The First Amendment Bill was referred to a Select Committee of 21 
members including Jawaharlal Nehru, Ambedkar and Rajagopalachari. 
46 XII PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, Part II, Col. 9632 (May 16, 1951) (emphasis 
added). 
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when his government placed laws other than land reform laws in 
the schedule.47 Since then started the marathon legislative effort of 
filling the schedule. Presently, the schedule contains 284 entries of 
which 137 are original Acts and 147 are amending Acts to those 
already included in the schedule.  
The most serious aberration occurred during the period of national 
emergency on the ground of internal disturbance, when The 
Representation of the People Act, 1951, Maintenance of Internal 
Security Act, 1971 and the Prevention of Publication of 
Objectionable Matters Act, 1976 found its way into the immunity 
zone.48 However these three statutes were later deleted by the 
Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. It is to be 
remembered that the judiciary could have done nothing about this 
deviation even if the Parliament had not decided to delete these 
detestable entries. Even now, there remains in the schedule an odd 
set of statutes like some sections of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 
and the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.  
The more recent abuse of the schedule can be seen in the 
Constitution (Seventy Sixth Amendment) Act, 1994 which added a 
reservation law49 , which provides for 69% reservation, in the 
schedule. This was made deliberately to override the judicial 
pronouncements50 that fixed the 50% rule as the permissible 
                                                          
47 Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 (inserted seven Acts, of 
which only four were land reform laws, the other three being on 
insurance, railways and industries). 
48 The first two statutes were inserted by the Constitution (Thirty-ninth 
Amendment) Act, 1975 as entries 87 and 92 and the third statute was 
inserted by the Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act, 1976 as entry 130. 
49 The Tamil Nadu Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes (Reservation of Seats in Educational Institutions and of 
Appointments or Posts in the Services under the State) Act, NO. 44 of 1994 
(1993). 
50 M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 649 (the 50% rule laid 
down was conditionally confirmed in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 
A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 447). See also Devadasan v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 
179; State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 490; A.B.S.K. Sangh 
v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 298; K.C. Vasanth Kumar v. State of 
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quantum of reservation. The court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of 
India51 had allowed relaxation from the 50 per cent rule and 
explained that any relaxation has to be exercised with extreme 
caution and with special care52 and should be determined on the 
basis of facts and circumstances of each case.53 Hence, it is 
submitted that any fifty plus rule should inevitably be subjected to 
judicial review, lest the existence of special circumstances would be 
left to be decided by the unstructured discretion of the authority 
concerned. Therefore, shutting the doors of judicial scrutiny in such 
areas would prove to be a death knell of principle of equality and 
rule of law. 
Judicial Review of the Ninth Schedule 
Judiciary can respond to the ouster clause like the Ninth Schedule 
in one of the two ways. It can either abide by the legislative 
instruction or refuse to enter the forbidden areas or it can evolve its 
own judicial device to break through the legislative scheme. To 
analyse the mindset of the judiciary in this area, it becomes 
necessary to rove through the court‟s field of activity. 
It was to overcome the difficulties created by judicial 
pronouncements in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh54 and similar 
other cases55 that the Ninth Schedule was inserted into the 
Constitution. The court in turn, lost no time in jumping over the 
                                                                                                                                    
Karnataka, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1498; Chakradhar v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1988 
S.C. 959. 
51 A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477. 
52 See id. at 566 (as per Jeevan Reddy,J., who delivered the majority 
judgment). 
53 See id. at 666 (as per Sawant,J., in his concurrent judgment). 
54 A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 252, 261 (In this case, three judges of a five judge bench 
upheld the Patna High Court‟s verdict and ruled the impugned provisions 
invalid, even though the First Amendment Had placed it in the Ninth 
Schedule, supposedly beyond judicial scrutiny). See also Krishnan Thangal 
v. State, A.I.R. 1971 Ker. 65. 
55 CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY DEBATES, supra note 36. 
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legislative hurdle by striking down legislations in the schedule on 
the ground of legislative incompetence. In Kameshwar Singh, 
Patanjali Sasthri, J., found that the placing of statutes in the Ninth 
Schedule provides no immunity from attacks based on lack of 
legislative competence. Rather, Articles 31A and 31B afford only 
limited protection against only one ground of challenge, namely 
violation of fundamental rights. However in Dhirubha Devisingh 
Gohil v. State of Bombay56, the court extended the protection of the 
schedule to laws made under the Government of India Act, 1935 
which violated Section 299 of the Act57. In a host of cases,58 the 
courts endured to carry out the legislative intention by immunising 
the Ninth Schedule entries from Part III challenges. The most recent 
challenge of the protected Acts arose in I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil 
Nadu59 where the court held that to invalidate a Ninth Schedule 
entry, mere incompatibility with fundamental rights are 
insufficient, rather it should violate the basic structure of the 
Constitution. 
                                                          
56 A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 457. 
57 Government of India Act, 26 GEO. V & 1 EDW. VIII CH. 2 (1935), §299 
(dealt with the right to compensation in cases of land acquisition). 
58 State of West Bengal v. Naba Kumar, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 16; State of U.P. v. 
Brijendra Singh, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 14; Gopalakrishna Yachendra v. Krishna 
Yachendra, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 842; Ram Kissen v. Divisional Forest Officer, 
A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 625; Latafat Alikhan v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2070; 
Hasmukhalal v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2316; Dattatrey Govind 
Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra,  A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 915; State of 
Maharashtra v. Mansingh Padvi, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 916; Ambalal Golakbhai 
v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1090; Sanwal Ram v. Addl. District 
Magistrate, A.I.R. 1982 Raj. 139; Nityanand Guru v. State, A.I.R. 1983 Ori. 
54; Bapi Raju v. State of A.P., A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1073; Lingappa Appelwar v. 
State of Maharashtra,  A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 389; Dattatrya Shankarbhat 
Ambalgi v. State of Maharashtra,  A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1796; A.G. for India v. 
Amratlal Prajivandas, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 2179. 
59 A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 861. 
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Retrospective Validity of Legislations 
In spite of the express words “. . . none of the Acts… shall be 
deemed to be void or ever to have become void . . .” in Article 31B, 
doubts have been raised regarding the retrospective effect of the 
Acts etc. included in the schedule. The Supreme Court in L. 
Jagannath v. Authorised Officer60 held that “. . . such curing of the 
defect61 took place with retrospective operation from the dates on 
which the Acts were put on the statute book.”62 However, this 
retrospective operation of legislations sometimes causes hardship, 
as it may affect bonafide transactions. The evil is greater when the 
provisions are related to levy of penalty and forfeiture. The result 
would be that citizens could even be prosecuted for offences 
supposed to have been committed, even before the enabling Act 
was validated by insertion into the Ninth Schedule. 
The Scope of Amending Acts 
The scope of the amendments included in the schedule was often 
under the shadow of doubt. The courts took the same view in all 
such cases63 viz., that the protection can only apply to the Acts in 
the schedule and not to the subsequent amending Acts unless they 
                                                          
60 A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 425. 
61 Article 31B has cured the defect of unconstitutionality in the Acts etc. by 
placing them in Schedule IX. 
62 L. Jagannath v. Authorised Officer, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 425, 435. See also 
Subrahmanyam Chetty v. The AO, Land Ceilings, A.I.R. 1967 Mad. 422, 
424 (the Court remarked that such retrospective law should not be 
enforced strictly). 
63 See Abdul Rahiman v. Vithal Arjun, A.I.R. 1958 Bom. 94, 97-98; 
Ramanlal Gulabchand Shah v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 168, 174; 
Sant Singh v. State of J&K,  A.I.R. 1959 J&K 35, 38-39; Sajjan Singh v. State 
of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 845, 855; State of Maharashtra v. Madhav 
Rao Patil, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1395, 1400; State of Orissa v. Chandrasekhar 
Singh Bhoi, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 398, 400; Ramendra Nath v. State of W.B., 
A.I.R. 1975 Cal. 325, 329; Sri Kalimata Thakurani v. Union of India, A.I.R. 
1981 S.C. 1030. 
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are also included in the schedule by means of amendment to the 
Constitution. Any other interpretation would in effect confer upon 
a subordinate legislature the power of amending the Constitution. 
The Validity of Notifications Made Under the Provisions of 
the Entries of the Ninth Schedule 
It would be pertinent to enquire into the availability of the 
protective zone, in relation to the notifications etc. made by the 
governmental authorities under the enabling provisions of the 
statutes which find a favourable place within the Ninth Schedule. 
This query assumes even more relevance taking into consideration 
the enormity of the discretionary powers which might be granted 
to the administrative functionaries in making rules. 
In Vasanlal Maganbhai v. State of Bombay64, a notification issued 
under an enabling provision of a protected Act was under 
challenge. The petitioner argued that though the enabling Act was 
saved under Article 31B, the notification had in substance amended 
that provision and thus it amounted to a fresh legislation to which 
Article 31B cannot apply. Gajendragadkar, J., speaking for the 
majority held that if the Act is saved, then the enabling provision in 
the Act and therefore the notification made under that provision 
are also automatically saved.65 Conversely, Subbarao, J., who 
delivered a dissenting judgment observed that “It is the duty of this 
court to strike down . . . any blanket power conferred on the 
executive by the legislature”66 and cautioned that “If a legislature 
can legally be permitted to lay down a broad policy in general 
terms and confer arbitrary powers on the executive for carrying it 
out, there will be an end of the doctrine of the rule of law.”67 It is 
submitted that one cannot but agree with Subbarao, J. on this point. 
In a country governed by the Constitution and rule of law, it would 
                                                          
64 A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 4 (the impugned notification was challenged on the 
ground of excessive delegation). 
65 Vasanlal Maganbhai v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 9. 
66 Id. at 11-12. 
67 Id. at 13. 
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only be improper to give unbridled power to the administration 
and the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution can be no exception to 
this rule. Judiciary began to take a different view in the matter in 
the next decade. A seven judge bench of the Supreme Court in M/s 
Prag Ice & Oil Mills v. Union of India68 gave a strict construction to 
Article 31B and held that the protection does not extend to orders 
and notifications issued under the protected enactments. 
Considering the wide ambit of Article 31B, it is submitted that if 
protection is given to administrative orders and notifications, it 
would enable the administrators not only to make arbitrary rules 
but also to enforce them with retrospective effect.69 Therefore, rule 
of law demands that courts are not to be ousted of their power of 
review in this area. 
Constitutionality of the Ouster Clause: The Judicial Voyage 
The amending power of the Parliament has been a bone of 
contention right from the beginning.70 “The Indian Supreme 
Court”, as Professor Upendra Baxi remarked, “is probably the only 
court in the history of humankind to have asserted the power of 
judicial review of amendments made to the Constitution.”71 The 
                                                          
68 A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1296, 1309 (the Mustard Oil (Price Control Order 1977 
issued under section 3 of Essential Commodities Act, 1955, which is a 
Ninth Schedule entry,  was challenged as violative of arts.14, 19(1)(f) and 
19(1)(g). Chandrachud C.J., speaking for the majority observed that 
fundamental rights cannot be permitted to be diluted by implications and 
inferences). See also Ajay Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1984 
S.C. 1130, 1145; S.S.M.T Co-operative Society v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1977 
S.C. 441,442. But see Thampan Thomas v. State, A.I.R. 1976 Ker. 94. 
69 N. Krishna Raju Reddiar v. A.O., Land Reforms, A.I.R. 1967 Mad. 352, 
356 (the Madras High Court warned against such a possibility). 
70 See 3 H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (4th ed.1993) (for a 
detailed history of the conflict between the legislature and the judiciary in 
the context of amendment of the Constitution). 
71 UPENDRA BAXI, COURAGE, CRAFT AND CONTENTION 64 (1985) (Prof. Baxi 
describes the judicial journey through the Constitution Amendments as a 
Pilgrim‟s Progress which finally ended at the shrine of Basic Structure). 
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earliest manifestation of the fight over „custody of the Constitution‟ 
was the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which inserted 
inter alia Articles 31A and 31B in Part III of the Constitution. 
The prime issue in Sankari Prasad v. Union of India72 was whether the 
Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which inserted Articles 
31A and 31B was ultra vires and unconstitutional. It was argued 
that Articles 31A and 31B in fact makes changes in the 
constitutional power of the Supreme Court under Article 13273 and 
Article 13674 and that of the High Court under Article 22675 of the 
Constitution. The Constitution provides that such amendments 
need to be ratified by not less than one half of the state 
legislatures.76 The petitioner contented that since the requirement 
of ratification was not fulfilled in the case of the First Amendment, 
it was void and unconstitutional. Rejecting this argument Patanjali 
Sasthri, J., speaking for the five judge bench held:  
These articles do not either in terms or in effect make any 
change in Art.226 or in Arts. 132 and 136 . . . . Only a certain 
class of cases has been excluded from the purview of Part III 
and the courts could no longer interfere, not because their 
powers were curtailed in any manner or to any extent, but 
because there would be no occasion hereafter for the 
exercise of their powers in such cases.77 
It is submitted that it is very difficult to accept this interpretation 
made out by Sasthri, J., as far as Article 31B is concerned. Though 
no express change is made in the provisions dealing with the 
                                                          
72 A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 458. 
73 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA art. 132 (Appellate Jurisdiction of Supreme 
Court in appeals from High Courts in certain cases). 
74 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA art. 136 (Special leave to appeal by the Supreme 
Court). 
75 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA art. 226 (Power of High Court to issue certain 
writs). 
76 See CONSTITUTION OF INDIA art. 368(2)(e). 
77 Sankari Prasad v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 458, 464 (emphasis 
added). 
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jurisdiction of the courts, the effect of Article 31B is to curtail the 
power of the courts to some extent by foreclosing the possibility of 
judicial review in respect of ninth schedule entries. When an 
amendment of such high amplitude was made, the appropriate 
procedure would have been to get it ratified by the state 
legislatures. Hence the amendment ought to have been declared 
void for want of legislative procedure. 
 The Supreme Court in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan78 confirmed 
the decision in Sankari Prasad and once again upheld the 
constitutional validity of Article 31B. The constitutional bench 
found that the genesis of Articles 31A and 31B was to assist the 
state legislatures “to give effect to the economic policy in which the 
party in power passionately believes to bring about much needed 
agrarian reform.”79 In this way, the pith and substance of the 
provision was found relating to agrarian reforms and not affecting 
the power of courts. 
The Court in I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab80 enunciated the new 
doctrine of prospective overruling and therefore, the 
constitutionality of the schedule was upheld in respect of all 
previous amendments. The future additions to the schedule by way 
of constitutional amendments were restricted from taking away or 
abridging the fundamental rights. Subbarao C.J., declared that 
“Parliament will have no power from the date of this decision to 
amend any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution so as to 
take away or abridge the fundamental rights…”81 The Ninth 
Schedule, though expressly do not form part of Part III, the 
                                                          
78 A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 845. 
79 Id. at 853 (though a plea to reconsider Shankari Prasad was raised, the 
Court rejected it on the ground that it would lead to the inevitable 
consequence of rendering invalid the First and Fourth Amendments and 
that a large number of judicial decisions regarding the validity of the Acts 
included in the Ninth Schedule would also be exposed to serious 
jeopardy) See also id. at 855. 
80 A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643. 
81 I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643, 1669 (emphasis 
added). 
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amendments which the learned judge warned against is in effect 
part and parcel of the very same Part III. This is evident from the 
observation of Wanchoo, J. in the same case that, “. . . Article 31B . . 
. is a legislative drafting device which compendiously puts in one 
place amendments which would otherwise have been added to the 
Constitution under various Articles in Part III . . . . What the 
Parliament in fact did . . . was to amend various provisions in Part 
III.”82 
Enunciating the true nature and object of Article 31B, Hidayatullah, 
J. lamented thus, “Ours is the only Constitution in the world which 
carries a long list of ordinary laws which it protects against itself…. 
The true intent is to silence the courts and not to amend the 
Constitution.”83  
The Basic Structure Doctrine and its Impact on Ninth 
Schedule 
Overruling Golaknath the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati v. 
State of Kerala84 by a 7:6 majority held that Parliament can amend 
fundamental rights, but subject to the retention of the basic 
structure of the Constitution. A reading of the basic structure 
doctrine together with the holding that the Ninth Schedule 
insertions by way of Twenty Ninth Amendment was valid leads to 
either of the following implications.  
i. Ninth Schedule does not offend the basic structure, or 
ii. The two state Acts which were then inserted in the schedule 
do not offend the basic structure.  
                                                          
82 Id. at 1687. 
83 Id. at 1716 (according to the learned Judge, giving protection to such 
legislations can “hardly merit the description amendment of the 
Constitution”). 
84 A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1469 (the Court felt it too late to question the validity of 
the Schedule, as it had been valid since it was enacted. In this case, the 
Constitution (Twenty - ninth Amendment) Act, 1972 which inserted two 
Kerala Acts in Schedule IX was upheld). 
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If the second overtone is accepted, it would make the picture even 
foggier because of the vague connection between ordinary laws 
and basic structure of the Constitution. Masodkar, J. in Vithal Rao 
Udhrao Uttarwar v. State of Maharashtra85 asserted that an ordinary 
law cannot be subjected to challenge on the ground of basic 
structure and that for the purpose of the law it retained the 
character of a law made by the legislature. It is submitted that , it is 
nothing but a crude tactic to speak of the same letters as 
„amendment‟ for one purpose and as „law‟ for another purpose, 
both the interpretations being directed towards the same goal 
namely, saving of the legislation. If it was „law‟ as Masodkar, J., 
said, then would it not constitute „law‟ for the purpose of Article 
13(2)? When such a question is posed, the term „law‟ suddenly 
takes the colour of an „amendment‟ and shields itself from Article 
13(2). So the resultant effect is that, the legislation at the same time 
not only gets immunity offered by Article 31B but also evades from 
basic structure challenge on the plea of being an ordinary law. 
The gravest blow against the applicability of basic structure test 
manifested in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain86, where the 
constitutionality of an election law87 inserted in Ninth Schedule 
was in issue. The Constitution Bench abstained from reviewing the 
impugned legislation on the ground that Article 31B barred judicial 
review and that basic structure was applicable only to 
constitutional amendments and not to ordinary legislations.88 The 
                                                          
85 A.I.R. 1977 Bom. 99, 122 (appeals from this decision were dismissed by 
the Supreme Court in Dattatreya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, 
A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 915). 
86 A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2299. See PRASHANT BHUSHAN, THE CASE THAT SHOOK 
INDIA (1978) (for a detailed narration of the case from the filing of the 
petition to the final judgment of the Supreme Court). 
87 Representation of People (Amendment) Act, 1974 (which changed the 
election law relating to corrupt practices and expenses with retrospective 
effect). 
88 See Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2299, 2332, 2388 (Ray, 
C.J., opined that application of basic structure theory to ordinary 
legislation would denude the legislative power and encroach on the 
separation of powers. Mathew, J., considered the basic structure doctrine 
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ordinary laws, therefore, are to be tested on the touchstone, namely 
the Constitution. 
It is submitted that the outcome of such an interpretation is that the 
Ninth Schedule is deemed as a law above the „Higher Law‟ namely 
the Constitution. One can by no stretch of imagination accept an 
argument which allows the basic features of the basic law to be 
denuded by an ordinary law. As Professor Baxi opined, “It is 
certainly difficult to understand at a common sense level, why the 
basic structure limitation on higher (constituent) power may not 
operate upon lesser (legislative) power.”89 Ninth Schedule laws, 
though ordinary laws, when viewed as the creation of a simple 
majority of a state legislature, by way of their being injected into 
Ninth Schedule of the Constitution through a constitutional 
amendment, and should be seen as part of the basic law. So they 
should be amenable to the basic structure test. Accepting the 
dictum in the Election Case90 as far as the Ninth Schedule is 
concerned it would mean that the ordinary laws in the schedule are 
allowed to pass through the key hole of the iron gate of basic 
structure. 
The remarkable feat in this cloudy area can be found in the 
unanimous decision of a five judge bench in Waman Rao v. Union of 
India91. In this case, the court fully realised that the schedule was 
becoming dense and that some planning had become imperative, 
when it made the following pronouncement-  
All Acts . . . included in the Ninth Schedule prior to April 
24, 1973 will receive the full protection of Article 31 B . . . 
Acts and Regulations which are or will be included . . . on or 
after April 24, 1973 will not receive the protection . . . for the 
plain reason that in the face of the judgment in 
Kesavananda Bharati, there was no justification for making 
                                                                                                                                    
as a vague and indefinite yardstick to determine the validity of an 
ordinary law). 
89 UPENDRA BAXI, SUPREME COURT AND POLITICS 62 (1980). 
90 Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2299. 
91 A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 271. 
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additions to the Ninth Schedule with a view to conferring a 
blanket protection on the laws included therein.92 
Thus in Waman Rao, though constitutionality of the schedule was 
upheld it was specifically made subject to the doctrine of basic 
structure, laid down in Kesavanda Bharati.93 Interestingly, the same 
test of basic structure, which shall not possibly be used to check the 
validity of legislation, as per Indira Gandhi was applied to executive 
acts in S.R. Bommai94.  
Judicial Soliloquy 
Even while going by the legislative intention, the courts in certain 
cases thought about the injustice arising out of the impugned 
legislations covered by the cloak of Article 31B and Ninth Schedule. 
In Srikalimata Thakurani v. Union of India95, Fazal Ali, J., remarked, 
“Unfortunately . . . though the provisions . . . perilously border on 
arbitrariness . . . we cannot however strike down these provisions 
because they . . . fall within the protective umbrella and are 
immune from challenge.”96 Similarly in another case, the court had 
pointed out the glaring anomalies and inconsistencies in the 
impugned provisions and exclaimed that, “Even if the 
constitutionality of the measure be not open to attack, its 
                                                          
92 Waman Rao v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 271, 291. 
93 See also Minerva Mills v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789; 
Bhimsinghji v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 234; Sri Kalimata 
Thakurani v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1030; Sri Durundeswar Math 
v. State of Karnataka, A.I.R. 1983 N.O.C. 169; Panipat Woolen and General 
Mills Co. Ltd v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 2082. 
94 S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 1. See V.N. SHUKLA, 
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1012 (M.P. Singh ed., 11th ed. 2008) (for a 
discussion on applicability of basic structure test on legislations). 
95 A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1030 (West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 gave 
unconfined discretionary power to the authority to disallow the tenant to 
resume cultivation of land left uncultivated by the bargadar). 
96 Id. at 1033. 
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reasonableness is certainly open to challenge at the governmental 
level.”97 
The final declaration on the nature and character of protection 
provided by Article 31B to the laws added to the Ninth Schedule by 
amendments made after Kesavananda was made by a nine judge 
bench of the Supreme Court in I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu98, 
wherein the court was also called upon to reconsider Waman Rao. 
The fundamental question in this case was whether after basic 
structure doctrine was propounded, it was permissible for the 
Parliament under Article 31B to immunise legislations from 
fundamental rights by inserting them into the Ninth Schedule and, 
if so, what was its effect on the power of judicial review of the 
Court. 
Constitutional Validity of Article 31B: A Gliding 
Hypothesis 
Y.K. Sabharwal, C.J., speaking for the unanimous bench observed 
that the constitutional amendments under challenge in Kesavananda 
Bharati were examined assuming the constitutional validity of 
Article 31B, as its validity was not in issue in that case.99 In this case 
also the court proceeded on the same assumption while deciding 
on the extent and nature of immunity that Article 31B can validly 
provide. The court justified its assumption by holding that “mere 
possibility of abuse is not a relevant test to determine the validity of 
a provision”100 and so refused to make any assumption about the 
alleged abuse of power. 
It appears that constitutional validity of Article 31B has not been 
challenged since Sankari Prasad wherein the First Amendment Act, 
                                                          
97 Krishnan Thangal v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1971 Ker. 65, 73 (as per 
Gopalan Nambiar, J.). 
98 A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 861 (the order of reference made by a Constitution 
Bench of Five Judges in I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs. v. State  of Tamil 
Nadu, (1999) 7 S.C.C. 580). 
99 I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 861, 879. 
100 Id. 
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1951 was challenged on procedural impropriety as also on the 
constitutionality of amending fundamental rights, both claims 
stood refuted. In Sajjan Singh, the court refused to reconsider the 
decision in Sankari Prasad as to the amendability of fundamental 
rights, with the result that the validity of the First Amendment 
remained unshaken. In Golak Nath, even though the amendability 
of fundamental rights was disallowed, the doctrine of prospective 
overruling allowed the First Amendment and therefore the 
constitutional validity of Article 31B was retained. Since then, the 
constitutional validity of Article 31B was assumed by the court as it 
was not directly challenged in any of the later cases. It is interesting 
to note that the challenges since Kesavananda Bharati always rested 
on the constitutional validity of particular entries to the schedule 
and not on the scheme allowing such a compromise on 
fundamental rights. The hesitation of the court to alter long 
standing and finalised transactions account for the continued 
validity of an ouster clause like Article 31B despite the fact that 
judicial review constitutes an avowed basic structure of the 
Constitution.101 
Scope of Judicial Review after Kesavananda: Ousting 
Fictional Immunity 
The Supreme Court allowed the legitimacy of the amendments to 
insert laws incompatible with fundamental rights in the Ninth 
Schedule and thereby attempt to immunise them. Nevertheless, the 
laws so added to the schedule shall be subject to the right of the 
citizens to challenge them on the enlarged judicial review concept. 
The authority which enacts the law cannot oust judicial review and 
grant deemed validity to the laws. The validity of the laws can be 
ascertained only by an independent organ, which is none other 
than the judiciary.102 The court emphasised on the „impact test‟ and 
held that “the power to grant immunity at will on fictional basis 
without full judicial review, will nullify the basic structure 
                                                          
101See L. Chandrakumar v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1125. 
102 I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 861, 891. 
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doctrine.”103 Thereby, the delicate and difficult task of ascertaining 
the degree and necessity of legislative invasion on fundamental 
rights was assumed by the judiciary. It is submitted that with such 
a pronouncement the nine judge bench has endeavored to banish 
the capacity of the legislative wing to oust the review power of the 
courts. „Full judicial review‟ and not just limited judicial review, 
therefore forms the core of basic structure. If limiting judicial 
review by granting deemed validity to the laws nullifies the basic 
structure doctrine, as held in this case, it is a matter of imprudence 
to retain any ouster clause, especially Article 31B in the 
Constitution. The utility of Article 31B, hereafter poses a serious 
dilemma because the citizen can challenge a Ninth Schedule law, 
notwithstanding Article 31B. 
The Ground of Challenge: Connecting Basic Structure and 
Core Fundamental Rights 
The court having resumed to itself the power to examine the entries 
to the Ninth Schedule for determining whether the constitutional 
amendments by which they are put in the Ninth Schedule damage 
or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution, carved out the 
two level technique of such a full judicial review. At the first level, 
the violation of rights of Part III is required to be determined. Only 
if it is found to be violative, the second level review would apply, 
where the impact of violation is to be examined to ascertain 
whether in effect and in substance, it destroys the basic structure of 
the Constitution as reflected in Article 21 read with Article 14 and 
19 and the principles underlying them. If the finding is in the 
affirmative, the law would suffer from invalidation. However, if 
the validity of any Ninth Schedule law has already been upheld, it 
would not be open to challenge such law again on the ground that 
it violates the basic structure of the Constitution. When a law which 
was held to be violative of any rights in Part III is subsequently 
incorporated in the Ninth Schedule after 24th April, 1973, such a 
                                                          
103 Id. at 892 (emphasis added). 
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violation shall be open to challenge on the ground that it destroys 
or damages the basic structure.104  
It is submitted that the „essence of the rights test‟ as laid down in 
Coelho adds a fundamental rights flavour to the basic structure 
doctrine in the sense of drawing a conclusive presumption that any 
violation of basic structure invariably violates the golden triangle of 
Articles 14, 19 and 21. To put it in other words, the court presumes 
that only that which contravenes the legal principles underlying 
the golden triangle of rights is capable of violating the basic 
structure of the Constitution. This leads to a deduction that any 
amendment which is destructive of basic structure of the 
Constitution will also be violative of the core of Part III. This in turn 
secures to the citizen the unabridged right to use his fundamental 
right under Article 32 to challenge any such amendment to the 
Constitution, leave alone Article 31B. It is to be remembered that 
amendments to the Constitution can be challenged only on the 
ground of breach of basic structure, and the petitioner hereafter is 
allowed to deem that basic structure and the underlying principles 
behind the golden triangle are so intricately fastened together that 
no breach of one is possible without the breach of the other. 
Accordingly, automatic maintainability is allowed to a petition 
contending violation of basic structure of the constitution, subject 
to locus standi having been established. The ultimate gain, arising 
out of such a construction, is of the judiciary, because the source of 
judicial review of an amendment will be impliedly traced to Article 
13 (2). An enlarged judicial review concept can thus be read into 
Article 13(2), which could be paraphrased as follows, “The 
Parliament shall not make any amendment to the Constitution 
which takes away or abridges the principles underlying the 
fundamental rights under Article 14, 19 and 21 and any 
amendment made in contravention of this rule, shall to the extent 
of such contravention, be void”. 
                                                          
104 I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 892. 
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Conclusion and Suggestions 
The Ninth Schedule was an outcome of the conflicts 
between legislature and judiciary arising out of challenges 
to socio economic legislations. Property being no longer a 
fundamental right, challenges based on it would no more 
invoke the courts‟ review power under Article 13. Hence 
there is no pressing need to retain the Ninth Schedule in the 
Constitution. 
Ninth Schedule was intended to safeguard the policies of 
the government of the time. This is a wrong trend, because 
with the change of governments their policies also change. 
If social justice via land reform legislations was the policy of 
the government immediately after independence, 
disinvestment, denationalisation or compulsory licensing of 
life saving drugs may be the policy of the government at 
different points of time. A part of the Constitution should 
not be reserved to serve as an immunity zone to the policies 
of the government, constitutional or otherwise, of the time. 
If at all the schedule is to be retained in the Constitution, it 
should be thoroughly circumscribed by means of a specified 
constitutional purpose. That is, the schedule should contain 
legislations of a specified subject or purpose only. 
The legal relationship between the state and the individual has 
evolved over the years from subject hood requiring blind obedience 
and presumption of perfection of law to „citizenship of entitlement‟ 
demanding governmental accountability.105 This relationship has 
further evolved into „global citizenship‟ asserting the existence of 
basic human rights of individuals independent of any constitution, 
which is the theme of „world constitutionalism‟106. Therefore, 
constitutionalism is no more about mere obedience to any obscure 
                                                          
105 See Dawn Oliver, “What is happening to Relationships between the 
Individual and the State? “, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 441 (Jeffrey 
Jowell & Dawn Oliver eds., 2nd ed. 1989).  
106 See generally WORLD CONSTITUTIONALISM (Dr. Anthony D‟Souza & Dr. 
Carmo D‟Souza eds., Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2007). 
Ouster Clause                                  Christ University Law Journal, 2, 1(2013) 
51 
 
constitution rather it is regarding limitations on governmental 
powers. A democratic constitution with entrenched fundamental 
rights confirms the existence of basic human rights and ensures 
their protection. Constitutionalism denotes adherence to the 
fundamental values underlying such a Constitution; safeguarding 
the identity of the Constitution and promoting „constitutional 
sovereignty‟. Constitutionalism, for its viability, requires as its 
guardian a wise and independent judiciary, with good sense of 
justice exercising well defined power of judicial review. Any 
legislative attempt to exclude such a power, by means of an ouster 
clause, that too within the constitution is antithesis to 
constitutionalism.  
